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On 22 March 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its opinion (in 
the context of a Chapter 11 procedure) on the following question: 
“Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for 
distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected 
creditors’ consent?” 
Under the slogan: “Why step over a dollar to pick up a dime?”, the Court answers this 
complicated question with a simple “no”, thereby overruling the Bankruptcy Court, 
District Court and Third Circuit in an orderly fashion. 
“We begin with a few 
fundamentals” 
After distilling the above point of law from the complex facts (infra), the Supreme 
Court starts with a few fundamentals which are essential for a Belgian lawyer to gain 
a full understanding of the opinion of the Court. 
A Chapter 11 procedure (cf. gerechtelijke reorganisatie door collectief akkoord) has 
three potential outcomes: (1) the reorganization plan is approved and confirmed, (2) 
the Chapter 11 procedure is converted into a Chapter 7 procedure 
(cf. faillissementsprocedure) and (3) a Chapter 11 procedure is dismissed 
(verwerping). In principle, a dismissal aims to return the parties to the prepetition 
financial status quo (11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3)). Achieving this, however, is easier said 
than done. That is why §349(b) permits the bankruptcy court, “for cause”, to alter a 
Chapter 11 dismissal’s ordinary restorative consequences, so that it becomes a 
structured dismissal. The American Bankruptcy Institute describes a structured 
dismissal as follows: 
 “hybrid dismissal and confirmation order… that… typically dismisses the case 
while, among other things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting 
certain third-party releases, enjoining certain conduct by creditors, and not 
necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the case” 
(American Bankruptcy Institute Commission To Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 
2012-2014, Final Report and Recommendations, 2014, 270). 
This raises questions as to the potential conflict between a structured dismissal and 
the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule can be defined as a rule on the 
basis of which “a dissenting class of creditors must be satisfied in full before a more 
junior class may receive any distribution or keep any interest under the 
restructuring plan” (Art. 2(10) of the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second 
chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, Strasbourg, 22 
November 2016, COM (2016) 723). 
The facts of the case 
In 2006, Sun Capital Partners, a private equity firm, acquired Jevic Transportation 
Corporation with money borrowed from CIT Group in a leveraged buyout. Two years 
after Sun’s buyout, Jevic Transporation Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
At the time of filing, Jevic owed $53 million to senior secured creditors Sun and CIT, 
and over $20 million to tax and general unsecured creditors. Those circumstances led 
to two lawsuits. In the first lawsuit, a group of former truck drivers of Jevic sued Jevic 
and Sun. The claim against Jevic resulted in a judgement in favor of the truck drivers, 
worth $12,4 million, $8,3 million of which represented a priority wage claim under 11 
U.S.C. §507(a)(4). In the second lawsuit, a committee representing Jevic’s unsecured 
creditors sued Sun and CIT. 
In this second lawsuit, Sun, CIT, Jevic and the committee representing Jevic’s 
unsecured creditors reached a settlement agreement. Sun insisted that the petitioners 
of the first lawsuit, i.e. a group of former truck drivers of Jevic, would not receive 
anything. If they did, Sun would finance the lawsuit from the group of former truck 
drivers of Jevic against Sun itself. Consequently, the settlement required a structured 
dismissal which provided for a distribution deviating from the absolute priority rule. 
Sun, CIT, Jevic and the committee asked the Bankruptcy Court to approve the 
settlement and dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (structured dismissal). The 
former truck drivers as well as the US Trustee objected because the settlement plan 
distributed estate money to low-priority general unsecured creditors while the truck 
drivers – who, by virtue of their judgement, had mid-level priority claims against 
estate assets – had not been fully paid yet. That would be in conflict with the absolute 
priority rule. 
The Bankruptcy Court ruled that a violation of the absolute priority rule did not 
necessarily bar approval of a settlement plan because the proposed payouts would 
occur pursuant to a structured dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition rather than an 
approval of a Chapter 11 plan. According to the Court, there was no realistic prospect 
that, without the settlement and structured dismissal, there would be a meaningful 
distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors. The District Court and Third 
Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision (In re Jevic Holding Corp., 2014 
WL 268613). 
The absolute priority rule 
To answer the above-cited point of law, the Court started by recalling that the 
absolute priority rule has long been considered as fundamental to the Bankruptcy 
Code’s operation. The distribution of the estate assets in a bankruptcy procedure 
should be in conformity with the predetermined statutory and contractual priorities 
(M.J. ROE en F. TUNG, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends 
the Creditors’ Bargain”, Virginia Law Review 2013, (1235) 1243). 
Subsequently, the Court refers to the fact that the legislator remains completely silent 
about derogations from the absolute priority rule in structured dismissals (see 11 
U.S.C. §1112(b): Neither the word “dismiss”, nor “structured”, nor “conditions” 
indicates the possibility to derogate from the absolute priority rule). It is 
indeed unlikely that the legislator would have tacitly provided a backdoor to achieve 
the exact kind of priority-violating distributions that bankruptcy law prohibits in 
Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans. In contrast, the bulk of the provisions 
concerning dismissals in Chapter 11 bankruptcies foresee in transfers of assets to 
restore the prepetition financial status quo (11 U.S.C. §349(b)). The only phrase in 
§349(b) which deviates slightly from this, states that a bankruptcy judge may, “for 
cause, orde[r] otherwise” (i.e. structured dismissal). However, a contextual and 
teleological interpretation of that phrase leads the Court to the conclusion that this 
provision is designed to create the required flexibility for the judiciary to safeguard 
the rights which the parties would have acquired by relying on the pending Chapter 11 
procedure. 
Contrary precedents? Non-existing 
Next, the Court starts looking for contrary precedents. Unsurprisingly – since the 
practice of structured dismissals is relatively new –, the Court finds none. The Third 
Circuit referred briefly to In re Buffet Partners (L.P., 2014 WL 3735804). Indeed, the 
Court approved a structured dismissal in that case, but the facts differed substantially 
in one key respect: none of the parties with an economic stake in the case had 
objected to the structured dismissal. The other case on which the Third Circuit relied, 
was In re Iridium Operating LLC (478 F. 3d 452). However, that case did not involve 
a structured dismissal, which is a final distribution of the estate value, but 
an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund a litigation trust that would 
press claims on the estate’s behalf. The Court recognizes that In re Iridium Operating 
LLC is not an isolated case, but that courts regularly approve interim distributions 
that violate ordinary priority rules. Be that as it may, those distributions concern 
payouts to players who are vital for the going concern of the enterprise, such as 
employees, key suppliers and providers of fresh money (e.g. distressed debt 
investors). Those distributions, although in principle in breach of the absolute 
priority rule, are necessary so that a reorganization can take place successfully and 
the value of the estate can be maximized. Thanks to that “detrimental” distribution, 
the prima facie disadvantaged creditors will eventually be better off than without that 
distribution (e.g. In re Kmarkt Corp., 359 F. 3d 866, 872; Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 
157, 163-164). Consequently, one can assume that the creditors would have agreed to 
this course of action ex-ante (hypothetical creditors’ bargain). 
The facts about which the Court had to decide in this case are therefore not the same 
as those of previous cases. In a structured dismissal, like in the present case, a 
distribution in violation of the absolute priority rule is a definitive distribution 
and not an interim distribution. A priority-violating distribution in a structured 
dismissal, as in the case at hand, does not help the business-debtor to continue to 
exist; it does not make the disadvantaged creditors better off; it does not increase the 
chances of an approval of the reorganization plan; it does not help to restore 
the status quo ante of the creditors; and it does not protect any reliance interests. On 
the contrary. The distribution in the present case closely resembles proposed 
transactions that lower courts in the past have refused to allow, precisely because 
those transactions tried to circumvent the procedural safeguards provided for by 
bankruptcy law (See e.g. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F. 2d 935, 940; In re Lionel 
Corp., 722 F. 2d 1063, 1069; In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B. R. 261, 269; In re Chrysler 
LLC, 576 F. 3d 108, 118). 
The risk of a flood of undesirable 
consequences 
Consequently, the Court has – in our opinion correctly – ruled out the “rare case” 
exception that the Third Circuit created, allowing a distribution in violation of the 
absolute priority rule (under a structured dismissal) without the (hypothetical) 
consent of the creditors. That exception would cause a flood of undesirable 
consequences. Indeed, an exception to a rule creates uncertainty, which in turn 
increases the number of litigations, which in turn reduces the chance of approval of a 
reorganization plan (W.M. LANDES en R.A. POSNER, “Legal Precedent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”, J. Law & Econ. 1976, 271). In that context, 
RUDZIK stated that “Once the floodgates are opened, debtors and favored creditors 
can be expected to make every case that ‘rare case’” (F.F. RUDZIK, “A Priority Is a 
Priority – Except When It Isn’t”, Am. Bankr. Ints. J. 2015, 79). Therefore, one could 
use that “exception” to deviate from the legal protection granted to certain classes of 
creditors; that “exception” could alter the bargaining power of different classes of 
creditors (even in bankruptcies that do not end in structured dismissals); and the risk 
of collusion between different (classes of) creditors could increase considerably (the 
senior secured creditors and general unsecured creditors could team up to squeeze 
out priority unsecured creditors). 
The judgement as a structural dam: 
legally and economically sound 
It goes without saying that the judgement of the Supreme Court will work as a dam, 
successfully holding back the flood of problems described above. Moreover, the 
judgement is not only drafted in a legally coherent way, but is also economically 
correct. The Court, in her legal reasoning, de facto relies on a principle which, 
according to the creditors’ bargain theory, lies at the foundation of reorganization 
proceedings: bankruptcy proceedings are not allowed to alter the pre-insolvency 
rights of the different (classes of) creditors, unless the creditors as a whole would 
benefit from these alterations (D. G. BAIRD en T.H. JACKSON, “Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy”, University of Chicago Law 
Review 1984, (97) 100). The reason for that is simple. Only in that case can one 
assume that creditors would have agreed ex-anteon those amendments (T.H. 
JACKSON, “Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain”, Yale Law Journal 1982, (857) 860). The bankruptcy proceedings should 
therefore exclusively deal with maximizing the profits of the creditors as a whole and 
not with mere distribution issues. As indicated above, the distribution in the present 
case did not have a positive influence on the issue of profit maximization. Moreover, 
it was not even necessary nor possible to search for a potential hypothetical 
consensus, since the former truck drivers of Jevic had already objected to the 
outcome of the structured dismissal. 
Although the judgment is economically justified, the classic coherent judicial outline 
of the judgement will ensure that even the non-believers and criticasters will have a 
hard time formulating a persuasive dissenting opinion on the case at hand. 
One step further: the implications of 
the judgement for the practice of 
gifting 
One might wonder what the implications of this judgement are for the practice of 
gifting, whereby a senior class of creditors diminishes his rights on the estate assets 
in favor of a junior class of creditors, to obtain approval of a Chapter 11 plan from that 
junior class of creditors. 
At first glance, gifting faces the same problem as structured dismissals in the sense 
that it also seems to violate the absolute priority rule when there is an intermediate 
class of dissenting creditors, who has not been fully satisfied. Some judges believe 
that gifting is prohibited, since it is a violation of the absolute priority rule (Re SPM 
Manufacturing Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1st Cir. 1993), while others believe it is allowed 
(Re Armstrong World Industries Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 3d Cir. 2005; Re DBSD North 
America Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 2nd Cir. 2011). 
Unfortunately, the judgement of the Supreme Court refrains from commenting on the 
practice of gifting. In addition, the wording of the absolute priority rule leaves us in 
the dark as to the legality of gifting. A textual interpretation of the rule seems to 
predict that gifting is not allowed: a more junior class of creditors receives a 
distribution while a more senior class of creditors is not satisfied in full. 
In our opinion, however, gifting should be allowed. After all, the absolute priority rule 
ensures that the dissenting class of creditors receives the share to which it is entitled 
pursuant to its rank, unless the dissenting class of creditors (hypothetically) agrees on 
a deviation from that rule. The fact that a senior class of creditors transfers a part of 
its entitlement to the estate assets to a junior class of creditors, does not alter the fact 
that the dissenting intermediate class of creditors receives the share to which it is 
entitled pursuant to its rank (see also N.W.A. TOLLENAAR, Het pre-
insolventieakkoord, Deventer, Kluwer, 2017, 170-172). 
Recommendations for the European 
and Belgian legislator 
Since the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the 
efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending 
Directive 2012/30/EU of 22 November 2016 also includes the absolute priority rule, 
we would like, in conclusion, to give three concrete tips to the European and Belgian 
policymaker. 
Firstly, the American “reversed” absolute priority rule is absent from the proposal for 
a directive of the European Parliament and the Council. As discussed during the 
congress “Eyes on Insolvency 2017”, this leads to undesirably results (see also N.W.A. 
TOLLENAAR, Het pre-insolventieakkoord, Deventer, Kluwer, 2017, 166-169). 
Secondly, the European and Belgian policymaker would do well to consider the 
uncertainties concerning the absolute priority rule which are present in other 
countries (as in this case) in the process of drafting the definitive directive and during 
the implementation of that directive. Clear wording plays an important part in this 
regard. Lastly, we would like to mention the unfortunate wording of the “absolute” 
priority rule. The priority rule is, as you can see, not absolute: one can deviate from it, 
at least by way of (hypothetical) consensus. 
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